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ABSTRACT
Shelly Kagan argues that “unitarianism,” the claim that animals and 
humans have equal moral status, has intuitively implausible distribu-
tive implications. I argue that Kagan’s reasoning can, with certain 
modifications, be applied equally well to undermine his own view, 
and that the responses Kagan can make to this modified reasoning 
are also available to the unitarian responding to Kagan’s original ar-
gument. Accordingly, Kagan cannot consistently hold his own view 
while also endorsing his main against unitarianism.
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1. Introduction
Shelly Kagan (2019) argues that “unitarianism,” the claim 
that animals and humans have equal moral status, has intui-
tively implausible implications for how well-being should be 
distributed. I argue that, if unitarianism has intuitively implau-
sible distributive implications, Kagan’s own view also has in-
tuitively implausible distributive implications. I claim our in-
tuitions about the relevant cases are affected by a tendency to 
discount distributive considerations when the distributions in 
question are caused by natural forces rather than the actions 
of moral agents. If Kagan says this tendency is justified, his 
own view escapes the counterintuitive implications I raise, but 
unitarianism also escapes the counterintuitive implications 
Kagan raises. If Kagan says this tendency is unjustified, he 
can say that his view has the relevant implications but that we 
shouldn’t trust our intuitions that these implications are unac-
ceptable. But the unitarian can say that their view has the rel-
evant implications but that we shouldn’t trust our intuitions that 
these implications are unacceptable. Since the moves available 
to Kagan are equally available to the unitarian, Kagan cannot 
consistently endorse both his own view and his main argument 
against unitarianism.
In section two, I describe Kagan’s position. In section three, I 
describe a counterintuitive hypothetical implication of Kagan’s 
position. In section four, I describe a counterintuitive real-world 
implication of Kagan’s position. In both sections I offer a diag-
nosis of what’s driving our intuitions and explain why this is a 
problem for Kagan. In section five, I consider whether endors-
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2. Kagan’s Position
Many people think what matters is not just the total amount 
of well-being, but also how it’s distributed. If (to use Kagan’s 
example) men were extremely well-off while women were ex-
tremely poorly off, this would be “tremendously troubling” 
(2019, 59) apart from its impact on the overall amount of well-
being. If we could benefit women or provide a slightly larger 
benefit to men, we might think we should benefit the women 
for the sake of producing a more desirable distribution. An 
egalitarian principle says that “an outcome is morally objec-
tionable to the extent that the people in one group are signifi-
cantly worse off than the members of another group” (ibid.). 
Benefiting the women would reduce inequality. A sufficientar-
ian view says that it’s “problematic… when someone ends up at 
an unacceptably low level of well-being, with a life that would 
be acknowledged as inadequate and limited by any objective 
reckoning.” On such a view, it’s a “moral priority to bring peo-
ple up to this baseline level,” but “once someone has reached it, 
there is no longer a pressing moral mandate for the rest of us to 
try to improve their lives even further” (59-60). If women are 
below this baseline, it implies we should favor their interests in 
order to raise them to it. Prioritarianism says that “we do more 
good (from the moral point of view) the worse off the person is 
that we choose to aid” (60). This implies that aiding the women 
does more good, ceteris paribus, since they’re worse off. A 
“desert sensitive theory” says we have reason to want to see 
well-being apportioned to desert. Assuming men and women 
are equally deserving, the distribution will be “troubling” be-
cause women are so much worse-off while being equally de-
serving. There are other possible distributive principles; Kagan 
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I’ll say a distribution is objectionable if it generates some 
sort of claim on us--if, e.g., the distribution gives us reason to 
favor benefiting A over benefiting B by an equally large amount 
for the sake of making well-being more equal, or bringing A 
up to the sufficientarian baseline, or apportioning well-being 
in accordance with desert, or because A should have priority 
due to being worse-off. The term “objectionable” may fit better 
with some distributive principles than others, but it matches the 
way Kagan speaks (e.g., “tremendously troubling”) and any-
way can be taken stipulatively.
The problem for unitarianism arises from the fact that “people 
are normally at a tremendously higher level of well-being than 
animals are,” since there exist “a vast array of goods that people 
can and typically do have in our lives which animals lack or at 
best have in lesser amounts (or in less valuable forms)” (63). In 
fact, Kagan (42-45) thinks the unitarian needs this to avoid the 
counterintuitive judgment that you have no more reason to save 
a human than a mouse: while both are (from the unitarian per-
spective) equal in moral status, we have much stronger reason 
to save the human because the human, capable of achieving 
much more well-being, has a stronger interest in continued life.
But consider that, if tremendous numbers of people were at 
the low levels of well-being enjoyed by animals while a small 
number were at the high levels enjoyed by human beings, we 
would find this extremely objectionable. So if humans and ani-
mals have the same moral status, we should find the actual state 
of affairs extremely objectionable. Egalitarianism implies that 
we should heavily favor animal interests over human interests. 
Prioritarianism implies the same. Since the level of well-being 
enjoyed by a mouse would be far below the sufficientarian base-
line for a human, sufficientarianism implies the same. The des-
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ert theory implies the same as well, perhaps except in cases 
where humans have done something to make them more de-
serving (2019, 62-68).
We’re supposed to find something about this absurd. I see 
two ways to interpret exactly what that is. At times, Kagan 
speaks as though the unitarian is committed to saying that in 
practice we’re required to redirect huge effort into addressing 
the distributive claims of animals. Referring specifically to the 
egalitarian principle, he writes:
...to the extent that one thinks that equality is a signifi-
cant moral ideal... then the unitarian will need to find 
the vast inequality that obtains between people and an-
imals... to be a troubling and morally problematic state 
of affairs, something that we should strive to redress.
This would seem to mean, for example, that instead 
of favoring public policies under which we shift re-
sources from those people who need them less to those 
people who need them more, we should instead favor 
policies under which we shift resources from people 
quite generally to mice—and snakes, and birds, and 
frogs, and perhaps flies—so as to do what we can... 
to reduce the vast inequality that currently exists be-
tween people and animals.
Admittedly, there may not be all that much we can do 
to improve the level of well-being for mice. But it isn’t 
as though there is nothing at all that we could do. We 
might, for example, take to leaving expensive cheeses 
around for the mice to eat. Similarly, we could devote 
ourselves to putting out seeds for birds, or carrots for 
rabbits. There are myriad ways in which we could im-
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prove the welfare of animals, even if only modestly. 
And it seems to follow from the unitarian position that 
this is what we are in fact required to do.
But that, I think, is an absurd conclusion (64).
The problem with this interpretation is that the claim about 
what we should do in practice doesn’t actually follow from the 
unitarian position. For one thing, if our psychological capaci-
ties greatly increase our ability to flourish, presumably they 
also greatly increase our ability to suffer, so that the worst-
off humans are worse-off than the worst-off animals, and thus 
more urgent subjects of concern. Second, even when it comes 
to well-off humans, our ability to benefit them is likely much 
greater than our ability to benefit animals (partly because of 
the greatly increased capacity for flourishing that makes hu-
mans better-off to begin with). As long as distributive con-
siderations are not lexically prior to considerations about the 
overall amount of well-being--so that providing a much larger 
benefit to the better-off party can outweigh providing a very 
small benefit to the worse-off party--it may therefore make 
more sense to focus on humans (Brouwer and van der Deijl 
2020, 353-354). If all we could do to help the worst-off humans 
was to give them a few pieces of fancy cheese, it seems far 
from clear that it would make sense for public policy to focus 
on this.
But at other times, Kagan can be read as suggesting that 
what’s problematic is just the idea that the human/animal dis-
tribution is seriously objectionable at all--i.e., the idea that if we 
could equally benefit animals or (comparatively well-off) hu-
mans, we’d have a strong reason to benefit the animals for the 
sake of producing a more desirable distribution--regardless of 
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whether this has radical implications in practice. For instance, 
he says that he finds it “impossible to take seriously the sugges-
tion that this inequality is, in and of itself, morally objection-
able—that the mere fact that mice are worse off than us is mor-
ally problematic” (2019, 65) and that an advantage of his view 
is that it allows us to “avoid the implausible position that the 
current pattern—with mice, say, so much worse off than peo-
ple—is necessarily itself an unreasonable or unfair one” (78). 
I agree that it’s intuitively absurd to think the human/mouse 
distribution is objectionable, whether or not, conveniently for 
us, we don’t need to do much about this in practice. From here 
on, I’ll go with this interpretation of Kagan’s argument.
Kagan’s response is to reject unitarianism in favor of the 
view that animals have a lower moral status than humans. One 
option would be to say that animals lack distributive claims al-
together. Kagan rejects this on the grounds that “If distribution 
is a legitimate and significant moral concern when it comes to 
the welfare of people—and I take it that it is—then it is difficult 
to see why it should suddenly become utterly irrelevant when 
it comes to the welfare of animals” (2019, 77). Kagan instead 
suggests that we should endorse distributive principles which 
are in some appropriate way sensitive to moral status. What this 
looks like depends on the distributive principle we favor. E.g., 
we might say that the sufficientarian baseline for an individual 
with the moral status of a mouse is much lower than that of a 
human. Accordingly, it may not be objectionable if a mouse is 
at a level below the baseline for a human, provided the mouse is 
above the mouse baseline. Further, even if the mouse is below 
the mouse baseline, it will be below that baseline by less than 
it would be below the human baseline, so its situation will still 
be less objectionable than it would otherwise be (79-82). Ka-
gan offers analogous suggestions (82-87) for other distributive 
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principles: e.g., perhaps people deserve more well-being, just 
in virtue of being people. By adopting the hierarchical view 
of moral status, we can get the result that the human/animal 
welfare distribution is unobjectionable, or at least not very ob-
jectionable. We thus avoid the counterintuitive unitarian claim 
that it’s extremely objectionable.
For Kagan, moral status is determined primarily by one’s 
psychological capacities (2019, ch. 5). Since members within 
a species differ in their capacities, it’s thus strictly incorrect 
to speak of a human moral status, a mouse moral status, etc. 
What exists instead are the moral statuses typical of humans, 
mice, etc. (ch. 5.2). However, Kagan also holds that what mat-
ters is not just one’s actual capacities, but also one’s potential 
(ch. 5.4) and modal capacities (ch. 5.5). (Potential capacities 
are one what can develop, while modal capacities are what one 
could develop. E.g., a newborn is able to develop the capacity 
to reason; someone born with irreversible brain damage could 
have developed this capacity, had things gone differently.) Ac-
cordingly, even a human whose actual capacities are identical 
to those of a particular animal will likely have a higher status 
in virtue of their potential and/or modal capacities. This com-
plication won’t come up again, and from now I’ll follow Kagan 
in speaking (loosely) as if there’s a single status for members 
of a species.
3. Humans and Elves
Assuming one’s life is going well, it’s better for one that it 
last longer. And life expectancy seems relevant to distributive 
concerns. People object to, for instance, the gap in life expec-
tancy between Blacks and whites in the US, or between poor 
people and rich people.
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But consider fantasy or science fiction stories in which mem-
bers of species with roughly similar psychological capacities 
have radically different life expectancies. Elves and humans, 
for instance, have roughly the same psychological capaci-
ties, and so (on Kagan’s view) have roughly the same moral 
status. Yet elves live many times longer than human beings. 
However, people engaging with these stories don’t view this 
as objectionable. They do not think that, say, society’s heav-
ily discriminating in favor of humans in order to make up for 
their shorter life spans would be justified. In fact, when fantasy 
stories portray such discrimination (as in, say, The Witcher or 
Dragon Age) you’re generally supposed to react to this in about 
the way you’d react to real-world racism among humans. Yet at 
least three of the four distributive principles Kagan discusses 
apparently imply that it would be acceptable to discriminate in 
favor of humans. The egalitarian principle implies that, since 
humans are so much worse off than elves, we should (ceteris 
paribus) heavily favor their interests over those of elves in order 
to close the gap. The prioritarian principles implies we should 
give their interests strong priority. Assuming elves and humans 
are equally deserving, the desert-based principle implies that 
we should favor humans because they are worse-off than elves 
despite being equally deserving.
Indeed, an elven philosopher who read part of Kagan’s book 
might argue in the following way:
If humans and elves had the same moral status, we 
would be obligated to massively prioritize the interests 
of humans over the interests of elves. (Think of how 
objectionable we would find it if members of our lower 
class lived a mere eighty years, instead of the centuries 
the rest of us enjoy.) But of course we are not obligated 
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to do this, as even humans engaging with stories about 
us on Earth recognize. So humans must have a lower 
moral status than we do.
This certainly doesn’t seem right. Yet neither does the in-
verse argument (perhaps offered by a human philosopher who 
read a different part of Kagan’s book) that, since humans and 
elves are both equal in moral status but elves live so much lon-
ger, the interests of humans should be very disproportionately 
favored.
What explains our intuitions here? One possibility (which 
Kagan (2019, 74-75) imagines being offered by the unitarian 
about animals and people) is that distributive claims only arise 
within species. Inequality between humans is objectionable, as 
is inequality between elves, but inequality between elves and 
humans generates no distributive claims. Kagan rejects this for 
lacking a clear motivation. Indeed, it doesn’t really seem true 
that distributive claims cannot arise between humans and elves. 
Suppose elves lived so much longer, not because they were 
naturally more long-lived, but because society arbitrarily privi-
leged elves in such a way that they had the resources needed 
to achieve long lifespans while humans didn’t. That certainly 
would seem objectionable.
I think this last example shows us what’s really going on 
here: we tend to discount distributive considerations when the 
distributions in question are caused by natural forces rather 
than the actions of moral agents. (I’m saying we tend to do this. 
I’m not saying we’re always consistent about this--just that it’s a 
factor which clearly influences our judgments in certain cases.) 
The life expectancy gap between Blacks and whites is objec-
tionable because it’s caused by systemic racism. There is also 
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a life expectancy gap between, say, people with “good genes” 
and people without them. For all I know, it may be larger. But 
this gap is not intuitively objectionable, or at least not nearly 
as objectionable. It’s just the good fortune of the people with 
the good genes. The elf/human gap is relevantly like the bad 
genes/good genes gap, and we aren’t bothered by either of these. 
Similarly, the fact that Kagan’s example where men are much 
better-off than women seems “tremendously troubling” is sure-
ly influenced by the fact that real-world instances of such distri-
butions result from sexism.
Whether the tendency I’m discussing is justified is reflected 
in the debate among egalitarian political philosophers between 
luck egalitarianism and social egalitarianism. Luck egalitar-
ians (e.g., Cohen 2008) aim at eliminating the influence of brute 
luck--i.e., factors beyond a person’s control which make them 
worse off than someone else--on human life. From the luck 
egalitarian perspective (or at least the usual luck egalitarian 
perspective; cf. Tan 2008), if I’m worse-off than you because 
(say) you were born with some special talent which I lack, that 
would generate a distributive claim just as surely as would my 
being worse-off because I’m a member of an oppressed social 
group. From a luck egalitarian point of view, the human/elf gap 
would be extremely concerning, since it arises from natural 
factors beyond any human’s control. The luck egalitarian re-
jects the tendency I am discussing.
Social egalitarians, meanwhile, view the aim of egalitari-
anism as establishing a community of equals, free from op-
pression (Anderson 1999). On this view, distributions matter 
“as causes, consequences, or constituents of social relations. In 
general, a distribution is objectionable from an egalitarian point 
of view if it causes, embodies, or is a specific consequence of an 
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unjust social hierarchy” (Anderson 2012, 53). The racial life ex-
pectancy gap is objectionable as the specific consequence of an 
unjust social hierarchy. But social egalitarians will not object to 
unequal distributions caused by natural forces, unless they have 
some sort of pernicious effect: for instance, they won’t care if, 
say, residents of one isolated planet are better off than those of 
another (Anderson 2012, 54-55). Elizabeth Anderson illustrates 
this in the following passage:
When I was in graduate school studying under Rawls, 
the film Amadeus was released. Amadeus portrays a 
rival to Mozart, Antonio Salieri, driven to insanity by 
resentment at the fact that Mozart vastly exceeded him 
in natural musical talent, although Mozart’s puerile and 
vulgar character made him undeserving of his gifts. 
Salieri’s musical talents had earned him a prestigious 
position as director of Italian opera for the Habsburg 
emperor. He was not inferior to Mozart in income or 
employment. Yet he felt victimized by an injustice in 
his natural inferiority to Mozart. Rawls told me that 
he was appalled at the film’s sympathy toward Sal-
ieri’s perspective. To regard the superior natural good 
enjoyed by another as an injury to the self is envious. 
Envy is malicious, for the envious stake their sense of 
well-being on another’s deprivation. Malicious claims 
have no standing before the bar of justice (2010, 8).
Anderson would presumably say the same about the “superi-
or natural good” enjoyed by the elves. On the social egalitarian 
perspective, the elf/human distribution itself is objectionable. 
(Of course, it could have pernicious effects--e.g., elves use their 
long lives to amass wealth and power and dominate humans-
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-which needed to be addressed.) The social egalitarian accepts 
the tendency I am discussing.
For my purposes, it’s not important whether or not the ten-
dency I’m discussing is justified. The point is just this. The 
gap between humans and other animals seems relevantly like 
the gap between humans and elves. It arises, not from some 
sort of unfair social process, but as the natural result of each 
individual’s being a member of the species of which they’re 
a part. If our tendency is justified and the gap between hu-
mans and elves is unobjectionable despite our equal moral sta-
tus, then the “superior natural good” enjoyed by humans over 
animals will not be objectionable either, even if we’re equal in 
moral status. Unitarianism doesn’t have the implication Kagan 
claims. On the other hand, suppose our tendency isn’t justified. 
Then Kagan might reject our intuition about the human/elf gap 
and say that favoring the interests of humans would be justified 
after all. But in that case, it’s hard to see why Kagan should 
be so confident about our intuition that the ordinary human/
animal case is unobjectionable from a distributive perspective. 
We’re already saying that our intuitions about relevantly simi-
lar cases are unreliable. If anything, perhaps we should expect 
our intuitions about the human/animal case to be even less 
trustworthy. Despite his defense of humanity’s superior moral 
status, Kagan (2019, 5) agrees that “Our treatment of animals 
is a moral horror of unspeakable proportions, staggering the 
imagination,” so presumably he agrees that we have a tendency 
to discount the importance of animal interests to an unjustifi-
able degree as compared to those of humans (cf. Kasperbauer 
2018). But of course, this intuition is the keystone of Kagan’s 
argument against unitarianism. If Kagan goes this route, he 
can maintain that unitarianism has the allegedly problematic 
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implication, the justification for thinking it really is problem-
atic becomes unclear.
4. Mice and Greenland Sharks
As far as I know, elves aren’t real. Some people are skeptical 
of reliance on hypothetical cases. But we can find relevantly 
similar cases in the real world. These won’t involve humans, 
since, as far as we know, no other species has the kinds of psy-
chological capacities we do. But they could involve other ani-
mals.
The longest lived vertebrate species is the Greenland shark. 
They’re estimated to live between three and five hundred years. 
I have no idea what the psychological capacities of the Green-
land shark are. Neither do you, probably. Let’s say they’re about 
equivalent to those of a mouse. (If this is false, there’s some 
other animal I could have picked for which the comparison 
would be accurate, and it wouldn’t make any difference.) Mice 
(or whatever) don’t live nearly as long as Greenland sharks do, 
and so are significantly worse off. In fact, mice live only a year 
or two, and it seems reasonable to think they might have a low-
er quality of life at a time, too. (Being a prey animal probably 
means being scared more often, etc.) So perhaps Greenland 
sharks are hundreds of times as well-off as mice.
When it comes to egalitarian, prioritarian, and desert-based 
principles, we can say exactly the same thing here that we said 
about the elf/human gap in the last section. Popular distributive 
principles, as interpreted by Kagan, imply that we have strong 
reasons to prioritize the interests of mice over those of Green-
land sharks. But this doesn’t seem right. It doesn’t seem like 
we have much reason to go around leaving out fancy cheese for 
mice to make up for the fact that their lives are so much shorter 
Dustin R. Crummett
107
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
than those of Greenland sharks. Or if a zookeeper could choose 
to enrich the zoo’s habitats for either the mice or the Greenland 
sharks, and the Greenland sharks would benefit much more, 
few people think the zookeeper would have strong countervail-
ing reasons to instead enrich the mouse habitat to make up for 
their shorter lives.
Yet the hierarchical moral status view doesn’t help us here. 
On Kagan’s view, Greenland sharks are equal in moral status to 
mice (or whatever). An alternative would be to say that, while 
there is some distributive claim here, it’s extremely weak: since 
mice and Greenland sharks have lower moral status than we 
do, their distributive claims are comparatively weak. Maybe 
we mistakenly think the gap is unobjectionable because it isn’t 
very objectionable. But it isn’t clear that it wouldn’t be very ob-
jectionable. Even if (due to lesser moral status) the suffering 
of a mouse is not as serious as the suffering of a human, the 
intense suffering of a mouse still seems pretty serious. So if 
such a huge gap in life expectancy would be very objection-
able between two human beings, it seems that it ought to be at 
least pretty objectionable for such a large gap to obtain between 
the mouse and the Greenland shark, unless the significance of 
distributive claims is much more sensitive to status than is the 
significance of suffering. But why would that be?
One possible explanation for the judgment that the mouse/
shark distribution is unobjectionable is that we intuitively don’t 
think animals make distributive claims at all. If this is right, 
Kagan should reject the intuition, since he thinks animals can 
make distributive claims. Otherwise, it seems to me that what’s 
happening here is the same as what’s happening in the hu-
man/elf case: we don’t consider the mouse/shark distribution 
objectionable because it arises from more or less purely natu-
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ral causes. (On the other hand, when a distribution involving 
animals is the result of human action, it seems intuitively more 
plausible to think that it could generate strong moral claims (cf. 
e.g., Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).) So we can say something 
exactly analogous to the final paragraph of the previous sec-
tion: if the tendency to discount distributions caused by natural 
forces is justified, Kagan can say his view avoids condemning 
the mouse/shark distribution, but the unitarian can say the same 
about their view and the human/animal distribution. If it’s un-
justified, Kagan can error theorize the intuition that the mouse/
shark distribution is unobjectionable, but the unitarian can do 
the same for the intuition about the human/animal distribution.
5.Sufficientarianism
Perhaps sufficientarianism provides Kagan with an alternate 
way out of these examples. On sufficientarianism, distributive 
claims don’t arise if everyone is above the baseline. Perhaps 
both humans and elves (in the sorts of stories we’re imagin-
ing) are above the baseline for creatures of their moral status, 
and both mice and Greenland sharks are above the baseline 
for creatures of their moral status. Then there will be nothing 
objectionable about either of these distributions. Yet the fact 
that there are two different moral statuses in play, with two 
different baselines, allows us to say this without committing 
ourselves to saying that there would be nothing objectionable 
about a situation where human beings were at the level of well-
being enjoyed by the mice.
I see two worries here. First, the claim that sufficientarian-
ism is true is much more controversial than the claim that some 
distributive principle or other is true. If Kagan must commit 
himself specifically to sufficientarianism, his argument be-
comes much less worrisome.
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Second, I suggest that we don’t really have good independent 
reason to accept that the individuals in all these cases are above 
their respective baselines, and in fact that its being true would 
require a kind of suspicious coincidence. As before, Kagan sug-
gests that the differing sufficientarian baselines for different 
individuals is determined by their psychological capacities:
In fixing these baselines, what is it that makes it true 
that one kind of animal (a rabbit, say, or a fish) has a 
baseline that is lower than that had by another (a dog, 
or an elephant)? Why is it that an adequate life for an 
animal of one sort is different from an adequate life 
for an animal of another sort? Why is a decent life for 
a person so much higher in quality than a decent life 
for an animal? The answer, clearly, has to do with the 
psychological capacities of the different types of indi-
viduals (2019, 81).
This tells us that individuals with the same psychological 
capacities (including the same potential and modal capacities) 
have the same baseline, and that individuals with greater ca-
pacities have a higher baseline than those with lesser capaci-
ties. But it doesn’t tell us what, in absolute terms, the base-
line for individuals with a given set of capacities should be. 
In discussing the difficulties involved in determining what the 
baseline for a sufficiently good life is, Kagan plausibly suggests 
that we cannot “stipulate that the baseline is simply the average 
life actually lived by people (since it is easy enough to imagine 
worlds in which everyone has a more than decent life, or a less 
than decent one)” (80). He suggests it’s plausible to say that “a 
good enough life is one in which the person’s basic needs are 
reasonably met,” but correctly notes that this simply relocates 
the difficulty into determining what it is for someone’s “ba-
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sic needs to be reasonably met” (ibid.). He suggests that, for 
all this, “we do seem capable of judging certain human lives 
as good enough, others as better than that, and still others as 
falling short of any level reasonably considered adequate for a 
person. And it seems clear that comparable judgments can be 
made about animals as well” (ibid.). Presumably we’re able to 
make these judgments by consulting our intuitions about vari-
ous cases.
The problem here is that our intuitions about what consti-
tutes a decent life for an individual are pretty clearly affected in 
some way by (something like) the life expectancy achievable by 
an average member of their species under realistic, somewhat 
favorable conditions, quite apart from any differences in the 
psychological capacities which are supposed to fix the suffi-
cientarian baselines on Kagan’s view. If we were elves and poor 
members of our society were dying after a mere eighty years, 
we’d think they were being denied good enough lives, just like 
we think in response to the deaths of human children. We don’t 
think this about humans who die at that eighty years. But if 
elves and humans have the same moral status, they should have 
the same baseline. So at most one judgment can be correct. But 
it’s unclear why we should trust the judgment about humans 
over the judgment about elves--and if the elf judgment is cor-
rect, humans are below the baseline and the distribution is ob-
jectionable after all.
In fact, the situation is even worse than this suggests. Sup-
pose we were members of a species with the same psychologi-
cal capacities as humans but a much shorter life span. We’d 
probably again be inclined to think that our longest-lived con-
specifics had “good enough” lives. If this judgment is correct, 
Kagan avoids the problem I’ve been raising: both elves and hu-
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mans will be above the sufficientarian baseline, so the elf/hu-
man distribution is unobjectionable (given sufficientarianism). 
However, it creates another problem for Kagan. The thrust of 
Kagan’s original argument was that we would find distributions 
between humans and animals unobjectionable which we would 
find extremely objectionable among humans. But this has force 
only to the extent that we’re at least roughly accurate in our 
judgments about what’s objectionable among humans.
As I’ve discussed, one option for unitarians is to argue that 
they can consider inequitable distributions among humans ob-
jectionable when caused by unjust social forces while denying 
that human/animal distributions are objectionable in general. 
Another is to say that the human/animal distribution is ob-
jectionable and error theorize the intuition. But if we’re suf-
ficientarians and are open to the possibility that the baseline for 
humans is much lower than we think, another option becomes 
available: just deny that the relevant human distributions are 
objectionable. Kagan could respond that, even if the baseline is 
very low, some humans and animals will fall below it (e.g., by 
having net bad lives). We’d probably regard a human’s being at 
the same negative level of welfare as more objectionable than 
an animal’s being at that level. If humans and animals have 
different baselines, this could be explained as the human being 
below the human baseline by more than the mouse is below the 
mouse baseline, even though they’re both at the same absolute 
level (cf. Kagan 2019, 82). But this isn’t really available if the 
human baseline is very low. If it is, then assuming the mouse 
baseline isn’t negative, the human and mouse baselines math-
ematically cannot be very different, in absolute terms.
So here’s the problem. Kagan needs our actual judgments 
about the human baseline to be roughly accurate. But these 
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judgments would differ depending on how long, given favor-
able conditions, we actually lived. So it seems we should trust 
our actual judgments only if we think humans happen, under 
favorable conditions, to live about as long as the actual baseline 
for individuals of our moral status requires. But why would that 
be? Perhaps God benevolently created humans so that, under 
favorable conditions, we would tend to have sufficiently good 
lives. But I don’t think Kagan wants to say that, and otherwise, 
it seems like a massive coincidence.
Similar points apply in the mouse/shark case. If a zoo’s 
Greenland sharks were kept in conditions such that they died 
after only a year or two, we’d think they were being denied 
good enough lives. But we don’t think this about mice who die 
at that age. Again, at most one of these judgments can be cor-
rect. In fact, in order to avoid problematic examples involving 
non-humans, it needs to be more-or-less true in general that life 
expectancy and moral status vary in such a way that animals 
generally have “good enough” lives under favorable conditions, 
regardless of their moral status. (Otherwise we could make the 
same point by substituting for mice members of some species 
that never reaches the baseline, and substituting for Greenland 
sharks members of some psychologically similar species with a 
longer lifespan.) But why would this be? It’s true that we prob-
ably can expect some very general correlation between life ex-
pectancy and moral status: animals which are K-selected rather 
than r-selected tend both to have greater psychological capaci-
ties and to live longer. (Creatures which are K-selected (e.g., 
humans) have relatively few, high investment offspring, while 
creatures which are r-selected (e.g., mice) have relatively many, 
low-investment offspring.) But this doesn’t solve the problem: 
why couldn’t the real baseline just be a very high one that no 
creatures, K- or r-selected, meet?
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So this makes me wary of the sufficientarian response. It does 
seem intuitive to say that, e.g., a reasonably well-off mouse is 
living a good enough life, or that a reasonably well-off human 
is doing so. Yet, given Kagan’s account of moral status and of 
how it determines the sufficientarian baseline, these intuitions 
conflict with our intuitions about elves and Greenland sharks, 
and it seems clear that our intuitions are being affected by fac-
tors which seem, on Kagan’s view, to be morally irrelevant.
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